





The Real Estate ANALYST

SEPTEMBER
1937

Roy Wenzlick
Editor

A concise easily digested monthly analysis based upon scientific research in real estate fundamentals and trends... Constantly measuring and reporting the basic economic factors responsible for changes in trends and values... Current Studies... Surveys... Forecasts

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Real Estate Economists, Appraisers and Counselors




THE chart above shows the fluctuations of urban real estate activity, foreclosures, and rents in the United States from 1870 to the present. The chart to the left is the last five years of the upper chart enlarged to show monthly fluctuations. This chart is explained in detail in the article starting on page 632 in the November issue.

The national average of real estate sales for the month of August continued to decline for the third successive month. This decline is not uniform throughout the country, as 43% of the cities remained the same or showed an increase over the July figure. Residential rents remained stationary, while building material prices again recorded a very slight reduction. Residential construction, based upon the number of new family accommodations provided per 10,000 families, stiffened for the month of August for all regions except New England, which showed a marked drop. West, South Central, Mountain, and South Atlantic regions showed a substantial recovery from the loss shown in July. Foreclosures again recorded a sizable drop, and continued the steady decline for the past year.


The present recession, experienced during the past few months, is of a temporary nature and contains the seeds of recovery to correct itself. The too rapid increase in building costs in relation to comparable

rents and values of existing properties, a too optimistic building program in the spring, and a hesitancy on the part of demand due to the general business recession from political and labor uncertainty have all contributed to the present temporary lull. The general real estate picture has not changed and remains favorable.

AVERAGE ADVERTISED SINGLE FAMILY DWELLING RENTS 1935-1937



AVERAGE ADVERTISED APARTMENT RENTS 1935-1937




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REAL ESTATE TRANSFERS IN PRINCIPAL CITIES

1930-1937

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★ MONTHLY FIGURES NOT AVAILABLE


RATE OF GROWTH OF METROPOLITAN COUNTIES


THE rate at which a city is growing affects tremendously certain types of its real estate. It is quite obvious, of course, that subdivision property will sell better and at a higher price in rapidly growing cities than in cities which are stationary in population. It is not quite so obvious that in a period when construction costs are rising rapidly that rents and values will rise more steeply in a rapidly growing city than they will in a city which is growing slowly. The reason for this, of course, is that in the rapidly growing city vacancies are quickly absorbed, a housing shortage develops, rents rise rapidly on older buildings and continue to rise until they reach the level of construction costs, which is their upper determinant. On the other hand, taking an extreme example, a city might be losing population rapidly enough to maintain a large percentage of vacancy which was fairly constant in size in spite of improving business conditions and in spite of the fact that the older houses are constantly either being torn down or becoming too obsolete remain a part of the competitive market. In a city of this sort, regardless of how rapidly construction costs rise, rents and values will not rise proportionately. Contrary to popular opinion, commercial values in the downtown district do not depend so much on the rate of growth as they do upon the size of the city and the size of its trading territory.

In the charts on the six pages which follow we have attempted to show for the principal metropolitan counties the relative rates of growth for each decade from 1850 to the present. These charts are based on the county rather than the city as in a long period of years city boundaries change materially, while county boundaries seldom do, and the county limits often include important suburbs not inside the city limits. In a number of the cities on this chart more than one county has been included in the metropolitan area.

In order to understand these charts and what they indicate, it is necessary first to study the chart in the lower right hand corner of this page, which shows the typical rate of growth for each decade from 1850 to 1930 for metropolitan counties in the United States. It will be noticed on this chart that from 1850 to 1860 the typical county had increased in population by 41.1%. The increase from the 1860 census to the census of 1870 was 30.7%, and for each succeeding census enumeration the percentages are shown down to the last census in 1930, which showed a growth of 22.3% from the 1920 figures.


The chart on Albany on the following page shows that between 1850 and 1860 Albany increased in population by a percentage 58% below the typical increase in all metropolitan counties. This does not mean that Albany lost population, as it actually grew by more than 17% in this period, but it did not grow as rapidly as the typical metropolitan areas. A second example, Atlanta, shows a totally different picture. Over the entire period from 1850 to the present the rate of growth in Atlanta has been greater than the typical experience in metropolitan counties. From 1920 to 1930 it exceeded the typical rate by 82%.





RATE OF POPULATION GROWTH OF ME AS A PERCENTAGE ABOVE OR BELOW TY 1850-1930

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




OF METROPOLITAN COUNTIES

BELOW TYPICAL GROWTH

930


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
RATE OF POPULATION GROWTH AS A PERCENTAGE ABOVE OR 1850-

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GROWTH OF METROPOLITAN COUNTIES ABOVE OR BELOW TYPICAL GROWTH 1850-1930

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IN DOLLARS - 1935

MORTGAGE DEBT PER ACRE


- \$50 & OVER
- \$30 - \$49
- \$20 - \$29
- \$15 - \$19
- \$10 - \$14
- LESS THAN \$10

AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE ESTIMATED 1935 VALUE

PERCENT OF ESTIMATED VALUE — 1935

- 70 & OVER
- 65 - 69
- 60 - 64
- 55 - 59
- 45 - 54
- LESS THAN 45

MORTGAGE DEBT PER FARM AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE ESTIMATED 1937 VALUE




THE MORTGAGE DEBT ON FARMS

THE upper map on the page opposite shows mortgage debts in dollars per acre on farms in the forty-eight states of the Union. This map is based on the studies made jointly by the Department of Commerce and the Department of Agriculture on mortgage indebtedness of farms in 1935.

The lower map on the page relates these mortgage figures to the estimated value per acre of all farms in 1935 and shows the percentage of mortgage indebtedness to this estimated value. The high percentages shown in this study are rather alarming.

In most states the values of farms have increased since 1935; and we believe that in practically all states mortgage indebtedness has not increased, but in some states it has decreased. As no figures are available, however, on this decrease, we are assuming in the map above that the 1935 mortgage indebtedness has remained constant. The increase in land value since 1935, however, has reduced the percentage of indebtedness to 1937 values as shown above.

It must be realized that the high mortgage indebtedness on farms is due to a large extent to the drop in farm values during the depression, and it should also be realized that as farm values come back this percentage of indebtedness will drop, even though the actual amount of indebtedness remains the same. This is shown quite clearly by a comparison of the map at the bottom of the preceding page and the map at the top of this page. It will be many years, however, before mortgage indebtedness on the farms is reduced to a point where it can be easily carried.




THE RETARDATION OF NEW BUILDING AND ITS PRINCIPAL CAUSE

THE full page chart opposite shows a comparison of the fluctuations by months of building material prices and the number of new family accommodations built per 10,000 families in all principal cities. All figures are shown as percentages of 1926. This chart shows quite clearly that the rapid increases in building material prices, starting in June, 1933, and extending through the middle of 1934, retarded the volume of new building done during 1933 and 1934. It will be noticed that the average for 1934 was below the average of 1933, in spite of the fact that general business showed marked improvement in the latter part of 1933 and 1934. Had building material prices in 1933 remained on a constant level, there can be but little doubt that the resumption of new building would have started several years earlier.

New residential building has just had a second relapse, as shown by the rapid drop in the bottom line on our chart from the high levels of this spring to the relatively low level for the last month. The cause of this relapse is not only the rapid increases in construction material prices, but the increases in building wages as well.

At the bottom of the depression in 1933 the constant refrain was that if credit could be loosened for building, a building boom would result. We said then and we have repeated frequently since, that the lack of credit was a result, not a cause, of the difficulty. The real determinant of the volume of new building under private initiative is not the looseness of credit but the relationship between cost and value of new building.

Each community has what might be called a mass opinion of real estate value. This mass opinion is what the community believes a house is worth. If rents are low, vacancies high, and the only buildings being transferred are being transferred at distress prices or by foreclosures, the mass opinion of value will reach a point far below construction costs. If vacancies are practically non-existent, if rents are rising, if transfers of property are taking place at higher and higher levels, the mass opinion of value rises rapidly until during the boom it will actually exceed construction costs on similar properties. Whenever this mass opinion of value is below replacement cost, contractors who have been encouraged to build with easy money find it difficult to dispose of their buildings at a profit. Whenever this mass opinion of value is above replacement cost, buildings can be sold as rapidly as they can be finished and a building boom results.



THE chart to the left shows the fluctuations in the bid prices of office and hotel building bonds. Office building bonds fell to a new low for the year. Hotel buildings showed a slight recovery from last month's low. Real estate securities have been affected by the general market.